Introduction
"Less Arms, Less Tragedies" is the title of a nationwide awareness-raising campaigns that was instituted in Croatia in 2007 to promote the "Citizen Alert" voluntary weapons-collection programme (VWCP). Still active today, the programme has so far collected more than 12,000 firearms, 300,000 explosive weapons and 4.7 tonnes of explosives, whilst the number of homicides committed with firearms has decreased over the same period. Implemented by the Croatian Ministry of the Interior (MoI) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the "Citizen Alert" VWCP appears to have been a resounding success, even prompting the former resident representative of the UNDP in Croatia to state in 2008 that it had constituted "by far the most efficient collection of weapons in the history of the UN" (UNDP, 2008) .
As reflected in the scientific literature, firearm violence and control are important topics in Croatia and in the Western Balkans. Hence earlier disarmament strategies have been thoroughly analysed (Faltas, McDonald & Waszink, 2001; SEESAC, 2005 SEESAC, , 2006 and the same applies to the illicit firearms market (Dragović, James, Mamić, & Mikac, 2018) and to those policies that control the licit and illicit arms trade (Grillot, 2010; Saferworld, 2007) . However, despite their apparent accomplishments, the disarmament strategies that have been implemented since 2007 have not been studied so far in any way and are not well known by the academics and public health and arms control practitioners that form the international small arms movement (SAM). This is not only surprising considering their apparent efficacy, but also because their method of operating includes a series of characteristics that break with conventional wisdom regarding the successful conduction of weapons-collection programmes. For instance, there is no termination period that applies to the amnesty nor the VWCP itself, nor does the programme offer any kind of incentive beyond legal amnesty for those citizens who voluntarily turn in their weapons or explosives.
These characteristics are noteworthy for a programme that seems to be successful against the odds. Combined with its apparent efficacy, they make the Croatian VWCP a highly interesting case study that should be analysed in depth, which is the central goal of this study. It aims to assess the performance of the "Citizen Alert" VWCP (2007 VWCP ( -2017 and analyse the pertinence and effects of its particular characteristics. As has been the case with other prominent weapons-collection efforts, its lessons and implications may be highly relevant to other countries -whether industrialised or developing -that are facing problems due to firearm proliferation and misuse.
For this purpose, the authors have collected empirical evidence from different qualitative and quantitative sources. This has included the examination and analysis of academic literature, reports, press articles, and legislative documents; the requisition of unreleased or under-utilised data from official sources; and the conduction of ten in-depth interviews in situ with criminologists, academics, security experts, defence analysts, and members of the Croatian Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defence, the Croatian Police and the Croatian Armed Forces (see Annex).
The article is structured in the following manner. Following the introduction, the second and third section provide a background regarding the theory and methodology behind disarmament strategies, as well as the policy context in which Croatian disarmament strategies operate. The fourth section analyses Croatian firearm culture, as well as the policies and programmes that attempt to counter their proliferation. The fifth section presents the disarmament strategy that includes the "Citizen Alert" VWCP and the "Less Arms, Less Tragedies" awareness-raising campaigns. The sixth section presents the programme results and evaluates its performance, while the seventh section discusses some of its most interesting elements. The paper ends with conclusions and a list of interviewees.
Disarmament Strategies in Crime Prevention Contexts
In 2016 only about 18 per cent of all violent deaths worldwide occurred as a direct consequence of armed conflict or terrorism, whilst an estimat-ed 3 per cent were related to legal interventions. Furthermore, around 78 per cent were classified as intentional and unintentional homicides in contexts that would traditionally be characterised as non-conflict settings 1 (Alvazzi del Frate & de Martino, 2013; Mc Evoy & Hideg, 2017) . The proliferation of small arms 2 among civilians is closely associated with this phenomenon. Firearms are not only the weapon of choice in around half of all homicides worldwide (Mc Evoy & Hideg, 2017; UNODC, 2017) , but their acquisition and use by civilians can, under certain circumstances, promote a culture of violence, cause greater fear, and trigger a higher demand for firearms and additional violence (Sanjurjo, 2016; UN-ODC, 2014; WHO, 2009 ).
This vicious circle has not gone unnoticed by policy-makers. The 1990s and 2000s were exceptional decades in this regard, as small arms became the subject of an effective securitisation process (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998 ) that led civil society organisations, national governments, and international organisations to acknowledge the importance of regulating their use at all levels of governance (Grillot, Stapley & Hanna, 2006; Hill, 2006) . The problems related to small arms proliferation and misuse have an international and multilevel character, which implies that national governments cannot possibly respond to them without interstate cooperation. In consequence, firearm control efforts operate at different levels by means of international agreements and conventions, national policies, and local programmes (Krause, 2007; Parker & Wilson, 2016) .
Furthermore, some policies and programmes focus on the local context in which guns are embedded. This involves the adoption of a public policy perspective to approach the interplay between small arms and complex and specific relations of power, wealth, crime, and violence. These socalled second generation measures (Krause, 2007) include security and firearm control policies, violence reduction programmes, and disarma- 1 The incidence and rigour acquired by lethal violence in non-conflict settings in recent decades has led experts to rethink the classification parameters associated with this matter. The dynamism and multiple dimensions that characterise outbreaks of violence in countries like Mexico or Honduras blur the criteria that allow us to distinguish between interpersonal and organised violence, or between political and criminal violence. In such cases, traditional classifications seem incapable of encompassing the violent phenomena at work and it even becomes difficult to draw a distinction between war and peace (GDS (Geneva Declaration Secretariat), 2011, pp. 11-42). ment strategies. The last measure includes the promotion of awareness campaigns and amnesties, as well as efforts to seize, collect, buy back, and destroy small arms, ammunition, and explosives.
Such disarmament strategies -a term that we will use in this article as shorthand for all such initiatives -show substantial differences related to the nature of the parties involved and the context in which they are executed. Programmes might be implemented to disarm civilians, insurgents, or even states, and they might take place in peace-building settings or in crime prevention contexts (Alpers et al., 2003; Karp, 2009) . In any case, they are based on the expectation that restricting access to lethal weapons will result in a reduction in the level of weapons-related homicides, suicides, and injuries (Wilson, 2014) . It is a complex undertaking involving three distinct tasks: reducing demand, controlling supply, and recovering stocks (Faltas, McDonald & Waszink, 2001 ).
The disarmament strategies implemented in Croatia since 2007 match the profile of what Karp (2009, p. 161) defines as "civilian weapons collection and destruction". Such programmes aim to improve public security directly by removing weapons from circulation, and/or indirectly by raising awareness about the potential dangers of weapon possession. Participants are individual citizens who may be former combatants but are no longer organised or responsive to military command. The programmes are commonly organised by the state, but international and non-governmental organisations can play important roles as well. In addition, it is common for the actual weapons collection and destruction to be principally symbolic, as guns are meant to become part of a dialogue about social goals. Success is thus measured by the reduction of crime and violence or, more modestly, by changing attitudes towards small arms possession and use. Finally, the collected weapons are destroyed or incorporated into existing government stockpiles (Appiolaza et al., 2002, p. 282; Karp, 2009, p. 161) .
Disarmament strategies in crime prevention contexts have become routine and widespread in recent decades but their results have been widely divergent. In fact, the idea usually prevails that these are not effective instruments to reduce crime and armed violence in non-conflict settings. This is because those who deliver their firearms in a VWCP -the most visible element among disarmament strategies -are usually low-risk users, without violent or criminal intentions. Criminals do not usually participate, unless there is some perverse economic incentive that allows them to deliver old firearms and access newer ones (Appiolaza et al., 2002, p. 306; Cook & Ludwig, 2000, p. 123) . Whilst this is usually true, the evidence also shows that within the right context, disarmament strategies can mobilise civil society and still exert a positive influence on local armed violence (Wilson, 2014) .
In fact, the debate surrounding the efficacy of disarmament strategies conceals a nuanced reality. Practical disarmament is neither a silver bullet for armed violence nor a threat to liberty and security. Its impact can be largely positive -even essential in some situations -but is rarely sufficient to achieve major improvements in human security 3 by itself. In order to have a positive impact, disarmament strategies must be comprehended within an integral policy to combat crime and violence: a lesson learned that is repeatedly pointed out by the specialised scientific literature (e.g. BICC & SAND, 2000; Faltas, McDolnd & Waszink, 2001; Godnick, 2010; Karp, 2009; OECD, 2011) .
This realisation has led armed violence reduction and prevention initiatives to evolve in recent years and incorporate wider batteries of measures addressing indirect causes of violence. A good example thereof is the OECD's "armed violence lens", which encourages practitioners to supplement disarmament strategies with broader measures tackling proximate and structural risk factors feeding crime and violence (OECD, 2011) . Most contemporary civilian disarmament strategies follow this pattern and are implemented as part of larger policy reforms that focus on gun control, but also on law enforcement and the broader justice system.
One consequence of such a combined approach is that it makes the outcome or impact evaluation of disarmament strategies almost impossible, due to the difficulty of isolating their particular impact from that of other measures implemented at the same time. This is actually the case with gun control policies as well, or any other crime-related policy or programme for that matter, as alterations in crime and violence rates are influenced by a complex combination of policies and social factors (Cook & Goss, 2014, Ch. 7; Ludwig & Cook, 2003; Santaella-Tenorio, Cerdá, Villaveces & Galea, 2016) . Another challenge for the assessment of disarmament strategies is a general lack of information regarding small arms and users. Whether this is because of practical difficulties, weak official oversight, or ideological or political opposition to transparency, inadequate user and firearm registries are a constant worldwide (Karp, 2007) and police seizures demonstrate that official registries only include a fraction of users and firearms in circulation (UNODC, 2015) . Consequently, researchers and practitioners work with estimates that result from a combination of sources and methods. These include official registration data, independent estimates, and correlations from crime evidence and basic local indicators (Karp, 2007) . Whilst research has come a long way in recent decades, authorities are still mostly in the dark about how many armed citizens and how many firearms there are.
Despite these challenges, it is essential for all disarmament strategies to include evaluation components (Appiolaza et al., 2002, pp. 311-315) and there are various ways of approaching outcome or impact evaluation. Hughes- Wilson and Wilkinson (2001, pp. 21-24 ) suggest a number of performance indicators that might be used. For instance, it is possible to estimate the percentage of weapons recovered by comparing the number of collected weapons with the estimated number of weapons present in the local community. Another indication of the impact of a programme is to compare crime statistics before and after the weapons-collection phase. Figures on firearm homicides, suicides, and injuries are especially useful in these cases.
Due to the challenges discussed, such performance indicators cannot provide a truly satisfactory evaluation of an isolated programme. Moreover, they are not to be used to compare the performance of different programmes, as there are too many influencing variables at play that render such a comparative approach invalid (Hughes- Wilson & Wilkinson, 2001, p. 24) . Nevertheless, their use will enable us to gain a more detailed idea of the performance of the Croatian disarmament strategy. The following section presents the context in which gun control policies and programmes are executed.
Country Background and Security Situation
The dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1990 led to the independence of Croatia -one of six Yugoslav republics -in 1991. However, that same year the Yugoslav People's Army invaded Slovenia, after which Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were attacked as well. The locally-termed Homeland War, or Patriotic War, began in 1991 and grew less intense with the arrival of UN peacekeepers in 1992. When the fighting ended in 1995, around 20,000 had been killed and hundreds of thousands displaced, producing a massive movement of people across national borders and leaving profound ethnic divisions in the region (Tanner, 2001 ).
Despite the grim perspective, the country experienced a remarkably fast process of rehabilitation and recovery. War and independence were accompanied by a swift transition to democracy and the market economy, as well as by massive legal and administrative reforms in all areas of government. By the mid-2000s, Croatia was stable and peaceful, had a growing economy and a consolidated democracy, and its political elites had their sights set firmly on EU and NATO membership. These aspirations implied even broader and deeper reforms in order to meet a range of outstanding policy requirements on such highly diverse issues as minority rights, security reforms, transport policy, taxation, and media freedom, amongst many others. In addition, even though Croatia is frequently cited as a success of EU and NATO integration processes, the accession to NATO in 2009 and to the EU in 2013 did not halt reforms and policy changes, which continue to this day.
It is worth noting at this point that Croatia, like South-Eastern Europe in general, does not fit the profile of a "high-crime region" nor does it have a "conventional crime problem" per se (Getoš Kalac & Bezić, 2017; UNODC, 2008, p. 23, 35) . Quite the contrary, crime and violence rates are much lower than the European average and all interviewees agree that crime has not been a relevant public issue for many years. In fact, according to Eurobarometer, although almost 60 per cent of Croatian survey respondents considered crime to be the most pressing public issue in Croatia in 2008, fewer than 20 per cent gave the same answer in 2017 (European Commission, 2017) .
The marked improvement of the crime and violence situation is a result of a sustained improvement of socioeconomic indicators, as well as of the many structural and programmatic reforms that the country has experienced over the last two decades. Although it is not possible to name them all, the most influential reforms with regard to crime and violence have probably been those concerning the armed forces, the police, and judiciary institutions.
Military reforms began soon after the war, as the Ministry of Defence needed to adapt the Croatian Armed Forces to assume their new role in a period of peace and regional integration. At the heart of these measures were downsizing, resettlement, and base conversion, as well as a transition from a national to a collective defence system. For these purposes, military personnel and bases were significantly reduced to save costs, and the remaining troops and stations were modernised to meet the criteria of accession to NATO (Edmunds, 2007; IMO, 2011; Pietz & Remillard, 2006) . The Croatian Police underwent major structural changes as well, as the force was gradually demilitarised, reorganised, and professionalised. Two broad and structural reforms were especially noteworthy (Vitez & Balgač, 2016; Vukadin, Borovec, & Golub, 2013) . The first was the creation of a Police Directorate, an operational arm of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), which would account for the transformation of the Croatian police into a modern and professional police force. The second major reform was the embrace of community policing as the police's central philosophy of work. This was a structural transformation that implied building relationships with local communities and developing partnerships and strategies with citizens to better reduce crime and disorder.
Finally, Croatia's judicial system underwent a complete overhaul in order to meet EU requirements. Amongst the most relevant reforms that followed the adoption of comprehensive reform strategies and action plans in 2005 and 2010, was the amendment of the Constitution to strengthen judicial independence and to reduce political interference in the State Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils. The adoption of a new Penal Code in 2013 was also important, as was the long process of rationalising courts and state attorney offices, dramatically reducing the number of courts across the country and achieving a reduction in backlog cases (Dallara, 2014, Ch. 2) .
Ultimately, the impact of such structural reforms on crime and violence rates cannot be understated. Therefore, the armed violence reduction and prevention initiatives that will be analysed in the following section must be acknowledged and evaluated as part of these broader reforms.
SALW Proliferation and Control in Croatia
The legacy of recent conflicts in the Western Balkans has been a significant proliferation of small arms and light weapons 4 (SALW) in the region (Grillot, 2010; SEESAC, 2010) . Croatia is a case in point, as weapons embargos by the EU and the UN during the Homeland War (1991) and the lack of a national military force resulted in the militarisation of Croatian society and motivated the acquisition of illegal weapons by the civilians and combatants. Large quantities of SALW flooded into the country as their domestic production increased substantially, diffusing throughout communities and becoming largely available to civilians fighting for independence (SEESAC, 2006) . As can be seen in Figure 1 , the proliferation of SALW and the long-term consequences of the war -most Croatians have experienced widespread violence, victimisation, and atrocities -have had a catastrophic influence on post-war rates of violence (Getoš Kalac & Bezić, 2017) . This can be seen especially in the rise of suicides and cases of domestic violence: two phenomena in which ex-combatants and war victims suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder play an important role (Bosnar et al., 2005; SEESAC, 2007 (Karp, 2007) . Most experts and practitioners who were interviewed for this study were not convinced by these figures, however, and believed that the real numbers were much lower. This view was also held by authorities from the MoI, who recently declined the possibility of replicating such a survey, as they did not believe that its methodology allowed a satisfactory estimate (CROATIA: NCSALW, 2014, p. 9).
In any case, these estimates were made before the implementation of the disarmament strategies that will be discussed in the following section. Hence the current "dark figure" is likely to be much lower. One sign of this is that the number of registered firearms has been significantly reduced. (Karp, 2007) . Either way, firearm ownership rates are often illustrative of the national gun culture. In the case of Croatia, the influence of firearms does not seem to be especially strong, except perhaps in the Dinaric Mountains region, along the current border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (SEESAC, 2006b, p. 32) . Most interviewees agree with this statement and the lack of firearms in Croatia at the beginning of the war testifies to this as well. At the time, most weapons were hunting rifles and it was only after the onset of the war that Croatia experienced a significant growth of civilian armament (SEESAC, 2006, pp. 3-6) .
At present, hunting and sport shooting are still relatively popular in rural areas. On the contrary, self-defence is an infrequent reason to acquire or own a gun. This is probably because crime levels are low and insecurity has not been perceived as a menacing threat for many years. Proof of this is that even in 2009, when crime rates were higher than today, 89 per cent of survey respondents claimed to be feeling safe when they were walking alone at night in their neighbourhoods (GfK Croatia, 2009, p. 14) . Most illegal weapons in Croatia are thus surpluses or "trophies" from the war, owned by ex-combatants and their relatives (SEESAC, 2006a) . Moreover, owners are not interested in trading their weapons, which is why the Croatian illegal weapons market is considered to be small and relatively flat (Dragović et al., 2018) . Ultimately, this makes Croatia an exceptional case, as disarmament strategies must work in a relatively peaceful crime prevention context, but one which has the weaponry of peace-building contexts. That is, civilians do not just own commercial small arms, but also an important number of military weapons and explosives.
Fortunately, the risks posed by the proliferation of military weaponry were not unnoticed by government officials. Above all, this was because the need to address firearm proliferation and control was an unavoidable challenge in order to meet the standards of Western integration (Grillot, 2010, p. 155) . SALW control was an important part of EU and NATO screening processes, particularly due to Croatia's geostrategic position as a transit area on the so-called Balkan Route for the smuggling of arms, drugs, and people into Western Europe (Dragović et al., 2018; Saferworld, 2007 (Dragović et al., 2018, p. 7) . Among the most important changes introduced were the following: the legal categorisation of small arms (A-prohibited; B-allowed, with prior permit; C-allowed, with registration; and D-allowed), a very rigorous definition of what constitutes a justified reason for procuring weapons for self-defence, the prohibition of borrowing weapons, the annulment of shared-weapon permits, the drastic reduction of the terms of validity of permits and licenses, and additional conditions and requirements for their general obtainment.
The last important measure were the different disarmament strategies that will be analysed in depth in the following section. However, it is important 5 Odluka o osnivanju Nacionalnog povjerenstva za malo i lako oružje (31.03.2005) [Decision on Establishing a National Committee for Small Arms and Light Weapons].
6 Nacionalna strategija i Akcijski plan za kontrolu malog i lakog oružja, NN 113/2009 NN 113/ (21.9.2009 NN 69/92, 26/93, 43/93, 29/94, 108/95, 20/97, 27/99, 12/01, 19/02 [Weapons Act] to note that the "Citizen Alert" VWCP and the "Less Arms, Less Tragedies" awareness-raising campaigns were not the first disarmament strategies to be implemented in Croatia. In fact, there were seven periods of amnesty and collection of SALW between 1992 and 2002, the most popular of which were the UN-facilitated "buy-back" programme in Eastern Slavonia (1996) (1997) and the nationwide "Farewell to Arms" programme (2001 -2002 ) (cf. SEESAC, 2006 . In total, the number of weapons and ammunition collected voluntarily over these seven periods is quite high: 33,598 automatic and semi-automatic weapons, over 1.6 million mines and explosive ordnances, more than five million rounds of ammunition, and over 7.6 tonnes of explosives (SEESAC, 2005, pp. 78-79). The EU would also play an important role further on, as it decided in 2010 to financially support SEESAC's arms control activities in the Western Balkans, which included assistance for the programme in question. The weapons-collection programme is included in Art. 97 of the Weapons Act of 2007, which compels citizens who are in unlawful possession of weapons categorised as A, B, and C to report them to the police for surrender or disablement. A toll-free phone line was established for this purpose so that citizens could call at any time, make a report, and obtain all the necessary information. Citizens were also able to use this mechanism to register permitted weapons or to voluntarily surrender legal weapons that they wished to get rid of. It is due to this methodology that the programme is referred to as the "Citizen Alert" VWCP (Dragović & Mikac, 2017) .
Once weapons, ammunition, or explosives are reported, the Croatian Police will send specialised officers to seize them at the owner's place of residence or their alternative location. To preserve the owner's public appearance, if circumstances permit, the police officers can approach his or her residence in a civilian vehicle and civilian clothes. The police officers will then issue a certificate to the owner or holder, accounting for the delivered goods. In most circumstances, the owners can also choose to keep the weapons in a disabled state. In this case, they have to apply for weapon deactivation within eight days of its surrender and bear the costs of disablement (cf.: CROATIA: MoI, 2007 might arise from their prior use of those weapons. As is the case with the VWCP, legal amnesty does not foresee a termination period.
Finally, the VWCP and amnesty are strongly promoted by a recurring awareness-raising campaigns titled "Less Arms, Less Tragedies". These campaigns were launched in a joint action by UNDP and the MoI in 2007 and renewed several times until 2014 (Dragović et al., 2018; SEESAC, 2011; UNDP, 2008a UNDP, , 2012 . The MoI has been carrying out its activities alone since then, although much less frequently and prominently than before (CROATIA: MoI, 2017b). The goals of the campaigns were to "raise public awareness of the tragedies that so often occur when weapons are handled irresponsibly and ineptly, to encourage citizens to voluntarily surrender all illegal weapons and explosives, and finally, to register all legally allowed weapons" (UNDP, 2008).
According to various interviewees, the financial and operative assistance of UNDP and SEESAC were fundamental for the campaigns' implementation and success. However, the effective implementation was run by the MoI with the operative support of other ministries, local governments, and the Croatian Mine Action Centre. On the other hand, the involvement of Croatian NGOs in SALW activities has not been significant. This is probably because even though many Croatians own illicit weapons, neither gun violence nor the illicit gun market have turned into serious public problems (Dragović et al., 2018) . Some organisations did provide additional and sporadic support, however: above all, the Croatian Red Cross, the Association of Croatian Homeland War Volunteers, hunting and shooting associations, and civil society organisations at the local level.
The awareness-raising activities were substantial and comprehensive. First, the organisers set up information stands in key public spaces of major cities throughout the country, where they promoted the VWCP, distributed informational material, and offered advice on new laws and regulations concerning weapons and explosives. The campaign was also present in the mainstream media through TV and radio ads, the internet, and print media. Some channels and radio stations even lent their active support, providing coverage and broadcasting campaign advertisements free of charge.
The campaigns also had different target audiences, because an attempt was made to reach social groups that are usually at greater risk of coming into contact with weapons. In cooperation with the Ministry of Education, the MoI organised workshops and lectures in elementary and secondary schools, during which specialised police officers would warn children and parents of the risks posed by SALW and advocate for their surrender or disablement. These sessions included the use of preventive material, such as leaflets, posters, and comic books. Other actions targeted at-risk youth, as well as areas of Croatia that had been affected by the war or had a stronger gun culture. Children and women were also special targets of the campaigns, with the purpose of indirectly reaching their parents' or partners' weapons.
A final element of the awareness-raising campaigns was the public destruction of firearms, which was not a permanent feature but was included in some of its editions. To the best of the authors' knowledge, there were 20 public destruction events held between 2011 and 2012, all organised by SEESAC, UNDP, and the MoI. The first took place in February of 2011 in the presence of Croatian President Ivo Josipović, while the last was held in October of 2012 and marked the successful destruction of 30,000 weapons recovered through different collection programmes (Dragović et al., 2018, pp. 19-20; SEESAC, 2011; UNDP, 2012) .
At present, all three elements of the disarmament strategy remain active. However, several interviewees have lamented that the awareness-raising campaigns had lost much of its vigour in recent years. It is assumed two factors have been responsible for the decay. The first is the fact that UNDP has distanced itself from the programme due to its new relationship with Croatia, because it has operated only as a self-funding project management office since 2014. 15 The second important factor was the abolition of the NCSALW in 2015 due to the successful achievement of its mandate. 16 Both factors withdrew crucial institutional support for the awareness-raising campaigns, which remained active and led by the MoI alone (CROATIA: MoI, 2017b).
Finally, it is important to note that UNDP and the MoI carried out a second VWCP in four Croatian counties between 2007 and 2014. Indeed, the "Destruction for Development" programme was a highly interesting development initiative aimed at areas that had been especially affected by the Homeland War and which were thought to harbour the majority of illegal military weapons (UNDP, 2008b) . With the financial support of UNDP and the help of the nationwide awareness-raising campaigns, the goal was to recover illegal SALW, ammunition, and explosives by financing small local development projects in those communities that returned the most weapons.
17 Unfortunately, we were unable to find any information regarding possible development projects carried out as part of this initiative, but the number of collected weapons and explosives suggest that it successfully supplemented the "Citizen Alert" VWCP.
Results
According to information provided by the Croatian MoI, the total number of weapons, ammunition, and explosives collected so far by the "Citizen Alert" VWCP (09/2007-11/2017) has been the following: 12,263 automatic and semi-automatic weapons (category A and B weapons); 316,458 mines and explosive ordnances (category A explosive weapons); over 4.8 million rounds of ammunition; and more than 4.7 tonnes of explosives (see Table 1 , [ponse No. 2).
As has been noted in Section 2 of this paper, it is almost impossible to do a proper impact evaluation of disarmament strategies due to the difficulty of isolating the impact of these particular measures from that of other measures implemented at the same time. The analysed VWCP and awareness-raising campaigns are no exception in this regard, as these were only components of broader changes in gun control policies, which in turn were also framed within a series of broad structural reforms that took place for over a decade in many areas of government, including the armed forces, the police, and judiciary institutions (see Section 3). Unfortunately, the simultaneous implementation of so many related policy changes does not allow us to identify specific causal relations between particular programmes and alterations in crime and violence. This does not mean, 17 The concept behind the "Development for Disarmament" programme has its origin in the 1999 Albanian "Weapons in Exchange for Development" Gramsh Pilot Programme. The idea is that development projects could complement the collection of weapons as a means of reducing public insecurity. To that end, the physical removal of weapons would reduce the supply of firearms, while development projects would reduce the demand for these by offering alternative occupations and improving social and economic welfare (Appiolaza et al., 2002, pp. 297-303). however, that the general combined impact of these reforms cannot be assessed. In that sense, statistics from the Croatian Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Health suggest that the combined approach of these reforms has had a positive impact on reducing the number of homicides and suicides committed with firearms (see Figures 1 and 2 ; e-response No. 1). Total homicides and firearm homicides have shown negative trends since the beginning of the series (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) , but the drop seems to be more pronounced for homicides committed with firearms. For instance, total homicides experienced a 67 per cent decline between 2000 and 2015, whereas firearm homicides experienced an 83 per cent decline during the same period.
A similar phenomenon has occurred with suicides: following a sharp increase after the war (Bosnar et al., 2005) , total committed suicides have shown a negative trend to this day. Suicide attempts, on the contrary, have been growing steadily over the same period, but the use of firearms in these attempts was halved between 1993 and 2016.
This phenomenon is extremely interesting, as it suggests that the influence of firearms on crime and violence has decreased over the years in Croatia.
Widmer & Pavesi (2016, p. 7) had already noted this curiosity in relation to Croatian firearm and non-firearm death rates, and suggested that such divergent paths could be the result of targeted firearm-related measures. This opinion is shared by the authorities of the MoI, who suggest that disarmament strategies were among the most influential reasons 18 for the constant decrease in violence since 2004 (e-response No. 1). Furthermore, the "Citizen Alert" VWCP was supplemented by the simultaneous implementation of the "Destruction for Development" programme (2007 Development" programme ( -2014 , which also collected weapons, ammunition, and explosives in a limited number of counties that had been particularly affected by the war. This programme offered collective incentives to citizens who surrendered their weapons but was still framed by the legal amnesty of Art. 97 of the Weapons Act of 2007 and by the "Less Arms, Less Tragedies" awareness-raising campaigns. According to Dragović & Mikac (2017) , over its entire lifespan this programme collected 9,484 automatic and semi-automatic weapons, over 87,691 mines and explosive ordnances, almost 4 million pieces of ammunition, and over 3,3 tonnes of explosives.
Thus, if we take both VWCPs into consideration and add all the pieces of automatic and semi-automatic weapons recovered, we arrive at a total of 21,747 collected small arms (see Table 2 ). This represents an estimated total of recovered weapons of approximately 2.24 per cent. Source: Own elaboration using data from the Croatian MoI; Dragović & Mikac (2017 (Sanjurjo, 2019) . The programme, which involved the payment of economic incentives for those who surrendered their firearms, led to the collection of 460,000 small arms, which was estimated to represent approximately 3 per cent of estimated private holdings (Dreyfus, De Sousa Nascimento & Guedes, 2008, p. 25) .
Furthermore, we were unable to find information regarding the actual condition of the recovered firearms. In any case, VWCPs are expected to recover mostly old and cheap weapons, many of which are even inoperative (Appiolaza et al., 2002, p. 306; Cook & Ludwig, 2000, p. 123) . However, this need not be the case regarding all recovered firearms. It is important to bear in mind that Croatian disarmament strategies worked in a relatively peaceful crime prevention context, but which had a surplus of weaponry from a recent war. Hence, many illegal-weapons owners have little practical reasons to hold on to military weapons that may still be functional.
Besides, in such an environment the risks of proliferation are not only posed by small arms, but also light weapons and explosives. In this regard, the implementation of both VWCPs allowed the additional recovery of over 400,000 explosive weapons (mines and explosive ordnances) and over 8 tonnes of explosives (see Table 2 ).
Ultimately, the application of these performance indicators allows us to suggest that the disarmament strategies implemented since 2007 have had a positive impact on the overall security situation in Croatia. Whether by themselves or most likely in combination with other policy changes and reforms, their implementation has helped reduce crime and violence rates in the country, whilst recovering vast quantities of SALW, ammunition, and explosives. Moreover, we were unable to find any negative impacts or consequences of their implementation.
Discussion and Good Practices
The apparent efficacy of the analysed programmes when it comes to recovering weapons and reducing violence is even more interesting when we consider that their operating mode includes a series of characteristics that break with conventional wisdom regarding the successful conduction of disarmament strategies.
The first uncommon element is that, beyond legal amnesty, the "Citizen Alert" VWCP offers no incentive of any kind for citizens to voluntarily turn in their weapons or explosives. This is not a novelty, but monetary or inkind incentives are usually considered key to a successful VWCP (BICC & SAND, 2000, p. 11) . According to interviewees from the MoI, the decision not to offer incentives was influenced by bad experiences during the "buy-back" programme in Eastern Slavonia (1996) (1997) , where criminal groups used the opportunity to turn in surplus stocks and gain a profit.
What is more, the organisers assumed that modern Croatia offered a favourable environment for a VWCP, as many gun owners saw no need to hold on to their weapons anymore. As suggested by SEESAC in 2006 SEESAC in (2006a , the overwhelming majority of Croatians perceive security levels to be high, whilst four out of five reject firearms and consider their proliferation an issue of concern in their community. EU and NATO membership is also relevant in this regard, as it makes new military conflict extremely unlikely. Therefore, the time was ripe for a strong VWCP and additional incentives might have been unnecessary.
Not all agree with this opinion, however. Most unauthorised firearms in Croatia are in the hands of ex-combatants, many of whom had to endure important sacrifices and pay substantial sums of money for their weapons during the Homeland War (SEESAC, 2006a) . Several interviewees argued that such owners would never participate in a programme that did not allow them to legalise their military weapons or at least receive some kind of monetary compensation in return for turning them in. As a result, the programme would mostly collect obsolete and defective weapons. A possible solution to this obstacle might be the implementation of an additional programme, which could offer non-monetary rewards for unauthorised weapons that were still operative. Some interviewees even suggested the possibility of inaugurating a museum in which valuable military arms could be put on display, as a form of recognition of ex-combatants and their sacrifice.
A second unusual element of the "Citizen Alert" VWCP is that the participants must call the police and wait for officers to come by their houses to collect their weapons or explosives. The reason for this is that many participants want to return mines, bombs, or explosives, whose transport requires extreme care and has to be carried out by professionals. However, this procedure requires high levels of public trust in the police and other security authorities. In fact, most VWCPs do not use military bases or police stations as collection sites and prefer churches, community centres, and other locations that are well known and seen as neutral (BICC & SAND, 2000, p. 11) . The relative success of the Croatian endeavour reflects the trust that Croatians feel towards their police and armed forces. Indeed, other state institutions do not enjoy the trust of the general population, but trust in the army and in the police seems to be relatively high (GfK Croatia, 2009; Vukadin et al., 2013, pp. 47-48) : an attitude that is not common in most places where VWCPs are implemented.
Finally, the duration of a VWCP is dependent on many factors, such as available funds and logistical variables. In our case study, the lack of additional incentives and the absence of weapons-collection sites allows the "Citizen Alert" VWCP to be permanent rather than temporary. Both the VWCP and legal amnesty are contemplated in Art. 97 of the Weapons Act of 2007, 19 which does not include termination periods for either. This means citizens may surrender or disable legal and illegal weapons at any time, without fear of punishment due to unlawful possession. This approach has positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, permanent amnesty may not motivate illegal gun owners to participate, as there is no practical requirement to do so at any given moment in time. On the other hand, it enables potential participants to judge the programme's preliminary performance and decide to participate when they see fit (for instance, after they have been assured that the legal amnesty will be respected and that the collected weapons will be destroyed). Moreover, it reflects a stronger commitment by the organisers to the long-term goal of reducing armed violence and the proliferation of firearms beyond other considerations, such as EU and NATO membership.
Conclusion
In response to a marked increase in the rates of armed violence during the first half of the 2000s, the Croatian Ministry of the Interior and the UNDP launched a disarmament strategy in 2007 that consisted of voluntary weapons-collection programmes (VWCPs), legal amnesty, and awareness-raising campaigns. Ten years after its initial implementation, the present study has sought to examine the development of this strategy, assess its performance, and analyse the pertinence and effects of its particular characteristics. To that end, we have analysed the context and policies in place, and applied a series of performance indicators that would enable us to evaluate the impact and outcomes of these programmes.
The main conclusion of this study is that the joint implementation of the "Citizen Alert" and "Disarmament for Development" VWCPs, legal amnesty, and the "Less Arms, Less Tragedies" awareness-raising campaigns has had a positive impact on the overall security situation in Croatia. Their implementation has helped produce a marked and steady reduction in the rates of crime and violence, whilst recovering vast quantities of small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Moreover, we were unable to find any negative impacts or consequences of their implementation.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that their impact on the rates of armed violence cannot be isolated, as these programmes were part of a series of much broader policy changes and structural reforms that took place for over a decade in many areas of government, including the armed forces, the police, and judiciary institutions. The impact of such broad reforms -in an improving socioeconomic context -cannot be understated. However, in combination with a strong disarmament strategy they constituted an indisputable and additional success. 
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